Marquette Law Review
Volume 73
Issue 1 Fall 1989

Article 4

The Case Against All Encompassing Federal Mass
Tort Legislation: Sacrifice Without Gain
Robert A. Sedler
Aaron D. Twerski

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr
Part of the Law Commons
Repository Citation
Robert A. Sedler and Aaron D. Twerski, The Case Against All Encompassing Federal Mass Tort Legislation: Sacrifice Without Gain, 73
Marq. L. Rev. 76 (1989).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr/vol73/iss1/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Marquette Law Review by an authorized administrator of Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
megan.obrien@marquette.edu.

THE CASE AGAINST ALL ENCOMPASSING
FEDERAL MASS TORT LEGHSLATHON0

SACRI FICE WITHOUT GAIN
A. SEDLER*
D. TWERSKI**

ROBERT
AARON

BE IT RESOLVED that the American Bar Association, recognizing
that separate adjudication of individual tort claims arising from a
single accident or use of or exposure to the same product or substance is inefficient and wasteful, seriously burdens both state and
federal judicial systems, poses unacceptably high risks of inconsistent results, and contributes to public dissatisfaction with the tort
law system and the legal profession, adopts the following recommendations of the Commission on Mass Torts ....
With this preamble as its factual predicate, the American Bar Association Commission on Mass Torts has undertaken to restructure the litigation
of mass torts in the United States. It has proposed legislation which would
empower federal courts to consolidate the litigation of mass torts in a single
court utilizing the law of a single state.2 Legislation similar to that proposed by the ABA commission is now under serious consideration by Congress. The Multiparty, Multiforum Jurisdiction Act of 1989 (H.R. 3406), 3
though different in many particulars from the ABA proposal, is driven by
the same concern for litigation efficiency. Though the motives behind these
legislative initiatives are laudable, these objectives cannot be achieved in our
federal system with its constitutional constraints, without doing serious violence to long-standing principles of state sovereignty and progressive trends
* Professor of Law, Wayne State University, A.B. 1956, University of Pittsburgh; J.D. 1959,
University of Pittsburgh.
** Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School, A.B. 1960 Beth Medrash Elyon Research Institute; J.D. 1965, Marquette University, B.S. 1970, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee.
This Article was supported in part by a grant from the Lawyers for Civil Justice.
1. ABA Comm. on Mass Torts, Report to the House of Delegates i (August 1989) [hereinafter ABA Mass Torts Report]. The Commission on Mass Torts was chaired by Robert F. Hanley.
Other members were Hon. Wm. Matthew Byrne, Jr., Richard Cunningham, Kenneth R. Feinberg, George S. Frazza, Professor Francis McGovern, George McKeon, Hon. Richard Ranson,
Paul D. Rheingold, Leonard M. Ring, Hon. Henry Woods, and Barbara Wrubel. The Report of
the Commission was concurred in by eleven of the twelve members. Paul D. Rheingold filed a
lengthy and thoughtful dissent. Id. App. E.
2. The draft legislation is entitled the "Federal Mass Tort Jurisdiction Reform Act" and
appears in the ABA Mass Tort Report, at Appendix D. Throughout the discussion, the authors
will refer to both the draft legislation and the discussion in the body of the report.
3. H.R. 3406, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 CONG. REC. E3275 (1989) [hereinafter H.R. 3406].
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in choice of law. We believe that their goals can only be accomplished by
riding roughshod over important federalism principles while concomitantly
reviving regressive and thoroughly discredited choice of law rules.
To make our case, we shall briefly describe the ABA proposal and H.R.
3406. We shall then demonstrate how seriously the proposed legislation
intrudes on state sovereignty and clearly articulated state interests. Finally,
we will turn to the crucial choice of law provisions of the legislation. We
shall conclusively show that little consideration was given by the drafters to
major constitutional choice of law cases. In their haste, they simply failed
to consider the practical effect of these cases on the discretion available to
courts in choice of law situations. Their proposals would, in fact, handcuff
the courts, forcing them to apply improvident and often wholly unwarranted choice of law principles. Without choice of law provisions, the proposed legislation is toothless. With such principles, the legislation is
monstrously wrong.

I.
A.

FEDERAL MASS TORT LEGISLATION

The American Bar Association Commission on Mass Torts Report

In August of 1989, the American Bar Association Commission on Mass
Torts issued its report to the House of Delegates suggesting radical changes
in procedures for the litigation of mass tort actions. Their suggestions are
embodied in a draft Federal Mass Tort Jurisdiction Reform Act.4 The legislation calls for the establishment of a federal judicial panel for mass tort
legislation.' Whenever at least 100 civil tort actions, claiming damages in
excess of $50,000 arising from a single accident, or use of or exposure to the
same product or substance, are pending in state or federal courts, the panel
may declare the cases "mass tort litigation." 6 Having done so, the panel is
empowered to transfer some or all of the actions to a federal court7 authorized to resolve all issues, including liability and damages.8 The power to
consolidate the disparate actions to a single federal district court is wholly
discretionary. It may transfer "some or all" of the cases as it sees fit. 9 The
transferee court may decide which issues should be tried on a consolidated
basis, and which issues it wishes to remand for individualized resolution. °
4. ABA Mass Torts Report, supra note 1.

5. Id. App. D § 103.
6. Id. § 103(c); see also id. at 5-14.
7. Id. § 104.
8. Id. § 105.

9. Id. § 103(c).
10. Id. App. D § 105(b).
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Acting pursuant to the interstate commerce clause, the legislation sets forth
federal question jurisdiction as the grounds for asserting removal power
over pending state and federal actions."I
Though the basis for the exercise of judicial power is federal question
jurisdiction, the ABA proposed statute does not adopt federal substantive
law, nor does it call for the judicial creation of a federal common law for
mass torts. 12 Instead, it seeks to empower federal courts to develop their
own choice of law rules for mass tort cases.13 In calling for legislative overruling of Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Manufacturing Co. 4 in mass tort
cases, the ABA proposal seeks the application of the law of a single state to
govern the mass tort claim.' 5 Though there is reference in the statutory
proposal to the possibility that the transferee court might choose the law of
different states for different issues,' 6 the drafters make it clear that without
the choice of a single state's governing rule for all parties, their proposal
will simply not work.' 7 The only statutory guidelines provided to the court
is that it make its determination "in light of reason and experience as to
which State(s) rule(s) shall apply to some or all of the actions, parties or
issues."'S
In addition to the aforementioned provisions, the ABA's proposed legislation has one section allowing courts to appoint impartial experts, 19 and
another which calls for a unitary assessment of punitive damages. 2' The
latter provision is in response to the complaint made by mass tort defendants that they are exposed to repetitive punitive damage judgments for a
single course of conduct which results in harm to multiple plaintiffs.
11. Id. § 104.
12. Id. at 28-30.

13. Id. § 106; see also id. at 30-36. The Complex Litigation Project of the American Law
Institute, which is still in a preliminary stage, also contemplates a federally imposed choice of law
rule for consolidated federal court cases. The choice of law rule would be contained in a federal
statute, but at the present time the drafters have left open the question of "whether the federal
choice of law rule should direct the application of a single state's law or might vary depending on
the issue." American Law Institute, Complex Litigation Project (Tent. Draft No. 1, § 309, 1989).
The proposed federally imposed choice of law rule supposedly would "reduce the incentive to
forum shop among federal courts that, applying distinct state choice of law rules, may reach
different conclusions about which substantive law should be applied to the underlying facts of the
case." Id. Our objections to the underlying premises of the ABA proposal and H.R. 3406 obviously apply to the ALI Complex Litigation Project proposal as well.
14. 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
15. ABA Mass Torts Report, supra note 1, at 28.
16. Id. App. D § 106.
17. Id. at 33-34.
18. Id. App. D § 106.
19. Id. § 108.
20. Id. § 110.
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H.R. 3406 -

The Multiparty, Multiforum JurisdictionAct of 1989

The Multiparty, Multiforum Jurisdiction Act of 198921 sets out to accomplish the goals set forth in the preamble to the ABA Mass Torts Commission Report. H.R. 3406 would establish a mechanism for channeling all
personal injury and property damage actions arising from single event
large-scale disasters into a single federal court for adjudication according to
a single body of state law.
To establish this channeling mechanism, the bill would: (1) give the fed22
eral courts original jurisdiction over actions arising from such disasters;
(2) provide for consolidation in one federal court of all federal court actions
arising from any such disaster; 23 (3) allow defendants to remove any action
from state court to federal court that could have been brought in federal
court in the first instance under the bill;24 and (4) direct the federal district
judge who gets the case to choose the state law to be applied to all actions
arising from the disaster, based on a laundry-list of considerations.2 5
Section 2 of the bill would enact a new Section 1367 of Title 28, giving
federal district courts original diversity jurisdiction over large scale disaster
cases if:
(1) The action involves "minimal diversity" between "adverse
parties."
(2) The action arises from "a single event or occurrence."
(3) The plaintiff alleges in "good faith that 25 persons have either
died or incurred injury as of result of the event or occurrence." "Injury" is defined to mean "physical harm to a natural person and
physical damage to or destruction of tangible property."
(4) "In the case of injury, the injury has resulted in damages
2' 6 which
exceed $50,000 per person, exclusive of interest and costs."
In contrast to the ABA approach which asserts federal question jurisdiction, the jurisdictional base of H.R. 3406 is grounded upon diversity of
citizenship. By requiring only "minimal diversity," H.R. 3406 would make
it significantly easier for a party to invoke federal court jurisdiction when
compared to the existing law, which requires "complete diversity." Thus,
under current law, no plaintiff in a case can be a citizen of a state in which
any defendant is a resident.2 7 "Minimal diversity" means that there need be
21. H.R. 3406, supra note 3.
22. Id.
23. Id.

24. Id. at 3275-76.
25. Id.
26. Id.

27. Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806).
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only one plaintiff and one defendant in a case who are citizens of different
states. Under the bill, there apparently need be no diversity between any
plaintiff and any defendant, and only "minimal diversity" between "adverse
parties." Thus, "minimal diversity" presumably would exist, for purposes
of Section 1367, if two defendants were citizens of different states and one
defendant asserted a cross-claim against the other.
Some additional conditions, relating to the geographical dispersion of
the defendants and the location of the disaster, would also have to be satisfied for a Section 1367 action to be brought. Under this section, jurisdiction
is triggered only if:
(1) " 'a defendant resides in a State and a substantial part of the
event or occurrence took place in another State;
(2) any two defendants reside in different States; or
(3) substantial parts of the event or occurrence took place in different States.' "28
In this regard, the bill appears to be somewhat self-defeating because of
the definition of a corporation's residence in subsection 1367(b)(2):
[A] corporation is deemed to be a citizen of any State, and a citizen
or subject of any foreign state, in which it is incorporated or has its
principal place of business, and is deemed to be a resident of any
State in which it is incorporated or licensed to do business or is doing business ....
Under existing law, a corporation is not a resident of a state simply
because it is incorporated, licensed to do business, or actually doing business there. 31 Under the definition of subsection 1367(b)(2), however, corporate residence would be established on that basis. As a result, it is unlikely
that two of the three alternative conditions for geographical dispersion
could be satisfied. The condition that a defendant "resides" in one state and
a substantial part of the event or occurrence takes place in another state
rarely will be met. This is because the defendant usually will "reside" in the
state where the event or occurrence took place under the "doing business"
component of the definition. The condition that any two defendants "reside" in different states also rarely will be met, because virtually all large
corporations do business in the same states.
According to the bill's sponsor, Rep. Robert W. Kastenmeier, the
events or occurrences within the contemplation of H.R. 3604 are plane
crashes, bridge collapses, hotel fires and the like. 3' Thus, the bill is nar28. H.R. 3406, supra note 3.
29. Id.

30. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332(c) (West Supp. 1989).
31.

H.R. 3406, supra note 3.

1989]

MASS TORT LEGISLATION

rower in scope than the ABA proposal, which would cover not only single
event mass disaster, but multiple exposures to a single product line. On the
other hand, jurisdiction is triggered with a far lower threshold than under
the ABA proposal. Only twenty-five rather than 100 claims need be involved. Furthermore, it is not necessary that there be twenty-five plaintiffs
or lawsuits, only that there be twenty-five persons who are alleged to have
suffered personal injury or property damage. Indeed, the federal court's
jurisdiction could theoretically be invoked under Section 1367 where
twenty-four injured persons have settled and only one holdout wants to sue.
Section 6 of H.R. 3406 would add a new Section 1658 to Title 28, directing a federal district court, in an action brought under new Section
1367, to determine what state's law should be applied to the action. This
determination would be based on a comprehensive "interest analysis," taking into account eleven specific factors. 32 The court's choice of law determination would govern all other actions arising from the disaster, and all
elements of each action, unless federal law applies or the court specifically
provides that some other state's law shall apply. The bill does not authorize
the creation of federal substantive common law for mass torts. Thus, like
the ABA proposal, H.R. 3406 refuses to mandate federal substantive law,
be it statutory or federal common law. Instead, state law is to be chosen as
the governing rule of decision. Though the concept of a single jurisdiction's
rule governing all the parties and issues of a mass disaster event is clearly

32. The pertinent section provides:
In making this determination, a district court shall not be bound by the choice of law rules
of any State, and the factors that the court may consider in choosing the applicable law
include -

(1) the law that might have governed if the jurisdiction created by Section 1367 of this title
did not exist;
(2) the forums in which the claims were or might have been brought;
(3) the location of the event or occurrence on which the action is based and the location of
related transactions among the parties;
(4) the place where the parties reside or do business;
(5) the desirability of applying uniform law to some or all aspects of the action;
(6) whether a change in applicable law in connection with removal or transfer of the action would cause unfairness;
(7) the danger of creating unnecessary incentives for forum shopping;
(8) the interest of any jurisdiction in having its law apply;
(9) any reasonable expectation of a party or parties that the law of a particular jurisdiction
would apply or would not apply;

(10) any agreement or stipulation of the parties concerning the applicable law; and
(11) whether a change in applicable law in connection with removal or transfer of the
action would cause unfairness.
Id. at E3276 § 6(a).
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central to the statutory scheme, subsection 1658(b) allows the
federal court
33
to override the single jurisdiction rule on an ad hoc basis.
II.
A.

THE ASSAULT ON FEDERALISM

Respecting State Sovereignty

Fundamental federalism considerations strongly militate against a federally required consolidation of "mass tort" cases, a federally imposed "single jurisdiction choice of law rule," and the resulting displacement of state
conflicts law in such cases. Both the ABA Report and H.R. 3406 fail to
give sufficient consideration to the impact of consolidation, and of the "single jurisdiction choice of law rule" on the traditional sovereignty exercised
by the states in our constitutional system. The focus of both the Report and
the bill is solely upon "efficiency and judicial economy," and upon the purported undesirability of "inconsistent results" in the adjudication of claims
arising from the same "mass tort."' 34 There is little, if any, concern that the
price to be paid for such "efficiency and consistency" is an improper intrusion on state sovereignty, by depriving the states of their power to promulgate the rules governing disputes between private parties in "mass tort"
cases, and to adjudicate such disputes in their courts.3 5
In American constitutional theory, the sovereignty formerly possessed
by the British Crown over domestic matters evolved upon each of the states
at the time of independence; 36 therefore, the states have the primary responsibility for developing legal rules that govern disputes between private persons, and adjudicating such disputes in their courts. As the Supreme Court
noted in holding that the full faith and credit clause generally does not compel one state to displace its own law in favor of that of another state:
[T]he very nature of the federal union of states, to which are reserved some of the attributes of sovereignty, precludes resort to the
full faith and credit clause as the means for compelling a state to
33. Id. § 6(b).

34. Id. at E3275.
35. As the Supreme Court has observed in another context: "[T]he Constitution recognizes

higher values than speed and efficiency." Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656 (1972).
36. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 404 (1819). Thus, American states
do not depend on the federal Constitution as the source of their power. In contrast, they retain

the general regulatory and taxation power and all other powers they possessed at the time of the
adoption of the Constitution, except to the extent that the Constitution prohibits or restricts a
particular exercise of state power. While this principle is textually embodied in the tenth amendment, in this respect the tenth amendment is merely "declaratory of the relationship between the
national and state governments as it had been established by the Constitution before the amendment ...." United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941).
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substitute the statutes of other states for its own statutes dealing
with a subject matter concerning which it is competent to legislate.37
3
Congress, of course, has the power, as a matter of federal supremacy,
to override or displace state law in any area coming within the federal legislative power. Since the federal legislative power, particularly the power of
Congress over interstate commerce, has been broadly construed,39 Congress
has the affirmative power to override or displace state law in "mass tort"
cases. However, as we shall demonstrate, the drafters of the mass tort proposals have gone about displacing state law in mass tort cases in a manner
that raises serious constitutional concerns. In any event, the measure of
Congress' constitutional power is not the measure of a proper exercise of
that power. Congress itself has recognized that any exercise of federal
power should be undertaken with due regard for the traditional sovereignty
of the states and their role in our federal system."
Nowhere does Congress' regard for the traditional sovereignty of the
states appear more clearly than in the matter of the states' power to develop
legal rules governing disputes between private persons, and to adjudicate
such disputes in their courts. Congress has recognized the primacy of state
law in disputes between private persons by requiring the application of state
law in diversity cases under the Rules of Decision Act."1 The Supreme
Court's holding in Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 42 that "state law" means the
common law of the state as declared by the highest state court, and its
37. Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493, 501 (1939).
38. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
39. See, e.g., Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971); Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United
States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
40. The regard of Congress for the traditional sovereignty of the states, when Congress is
exercising the federal commerce power, was emphasized by the Supreme Court in Garcia v. San
Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985), where the Court held that the Constitution
did not impose a "State sovereignty" limitation on the otherwise plenary commerce power of
Congress, even when the federal regulation affected the "States as States." Id. at 550-52. According to Justice Blackmun, writing for the Court in Garcia, the Constitution protects state sovereignty by "rely[ing] on a federal system in which special restraints on federal power over the
States inhered principally in the workings in the National Government itself, rather than in discrete limitations on the objects of federal authority," and that under the Constitution, "[s]tate
sovereign interests, then, are more properly protected by procedural safeguards inherent in the
structure of the federal system than by judicially created limitations on federal power." Id. at 552.
These procedural safeguards relate primarily to the role of the states in determining the composition of the federal government, such as by state authority to set voting qualifications, by the role of
the states in the Electoral College, and by each state's equal representation in the Senate. As
Professor Tribe has explained Garcia: "The Court evidently envisions that the constitutional procedure for lawmaking will result in a sound balance between state sovereignty and national interests." L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 480 (2d ed. 1988).
41. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1982).
42. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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"Klaxon holding," 4 3 that this includes the application of state conflict of
laws and rules, coupled with the Court's expansive interpretation of what is
"substantive" for Erie purposes," all reinforce Congressional recognition of
the primacy of state law in governing disputes between private persons.4 5
Congress has also recognized the primary responsibility of the state
courts to adjudicate disputes between private persons, including persons residing in different states. The exercise of diversity jurisdiction in the federal
courts has been carefully limited by requiring complete diversity,4 6 instead
of the constitutionally permissible "minimal diversity."4 7 Diversity jurisdiction in suits involving corporations is further restricted by the fact that,
as subsection 1332(c) specifically provides, a corporation is a citizen both of
the state where it is incorporated, and the state where it has its principal
place of business.4 Furthermore, in 1988, Congress increased fivefold the
jurisdictional amount in diversity cases, from $10,000 to $50,000.49

43. See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg., 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
44. See, e.g., Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740 (1980); Cohen v. Beneficial Indus.
Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949); Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945). But cf. Hanna
v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965) (FED. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(1) interpreted narrowly).
45. While Justice Brandeis' contention, that the result in Erie was constitutionally required,
has been the subject of much dispute, his observations in regard to the interplay between the Rules
of Decision Act and respect for state sovereignty are independent from his constitutional analysis.
He specifically held that the Rules of Decision Act was constitutional and that the "constitutional
problem" resulted from the fact that in applying the Act, "this Court and the lower courts have
invaded rights which in our opinion are reserved by the Constitution to the several States." Erie,
304 U.S. at 80. Those "rights," of course, related to promulgating the rules of law of the state
applicable to the resolution of disputes between private persons.
46. This means that diversity jurisdiction does not exist unless each defendant is a citizen of a
different state from each plaintiff. Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 373
(1978). The rule of complete diversity has been followed consistently ever since Strawbridge v.
Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806). Only the interpleader statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1335, has been
construed to require "minimal diversity." State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S.
523 (1967).
47. As the Court stated in Tashire: "Article III poses no obstacle to the legislative extension
of federal jurisdiction, founded on diversity, so long as any two adverse parties are not co-citizens." 386 U.S. at 531.
48. Subsection 1332(c) also provides that in a direct action against an insurer, the insurer is
deemed a citizen of the state where the insured resides, as well as of the state where the insurer is
incorporated, and of the state where it has its principal place of business. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)
(1986).
49. Along the same lines, when Congress enacted the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of
1980, it did not intend thereby to create an implied cause of action in federal court to determine
which of two conflicting state custody decrees is valid. Rather, Congress' purpose in enacting the
Act was to ensure that full faith and credit be given to one state's custody decree in another state,
but it was the state courts that had the responsibility of implementing the Act's provisions. See
Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174 (1988). In that case, the Court held as follows: "State
courts faithfully administer the Full Faith and Credit Clause every day; now that Congress has
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Congressional respect for state sovereignty in this area is also reflected
in the Court's extreme reluctance to allow federal preemption of the state's
power to promulgate legal rules governing the disputes between private persons.5 0 Thus, the Court has held that, although federal law controls the
radiological safety aspects of nuclear power, it does not preempt state tort
law remedies, including an award of punitive damages, for harm caused by
the escape of hazardous nuclear energy materials. 1 Moreover, in the labor
law area, where preemption is often found, the Court has held that in certain circumstances federal labor law does not preempt state2 tort law remedies in suits involving employers, employees, and unions.The foregoing illustrations demonstrate that under our federal system
the states have the primary responsibility for promulgating the law governing disputes between private persons, and for adjudicating such disputes

in their courts. Congress has traditionally been solicitous of the responsibility of the states in this regard. This being the case, proponents of a "federal
solution" to the purported problems of "mass tort" litigation, through the

displacement of state law and the role of the state courts in resolving these
cases, should properly bear a heavy burden ofjustification. They should be
required to demonstrate an overriding necessity for such a radical subversion of state sovereignty. In light of the values of our constitutional system,
extended full faith and credit requirements to child custody orders, we can think of no reason why
the courts' administration of federal law in custody disputes will be any less vigilant." Id. at 187.
50. Indeed, in any area, because of respect for state sovereignty, the presumption is against
federal preemption. As the Court has stated:
If Congress is authorized to act in a field, it should manifest its intention clearly. It will
not be presumed that a federal statute was intended to supersede the exercise of the power
of the state unless there is a clear manifestation of intention to do so. The exercise of
federal supremacy is not lightly to be presumed.
New York State Dept. of Social Serv. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 413 (1973) (quoting Schwartz v.
Texas, 344 U.S. 199, 202-03 (1952)). Congressional respect for state sovereignty in this regard is
reflected in several Supreme Court holdings. For example, state regulation of the economic aspects of nuclear power generation is not preempted by the federal Atomic Energy Act. See Pacific
Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190 (1983). Similarly, a state law requiring
employers to provide a one-time severance payment to employees in the event of a plant closing
was not preempted either by federal ERISA or federal labor relations law. See Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1 (1987).
51. Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238 (1984).
52. The Court has held, for example, that state courts are permitted to award damages to an
employee who was subject to a retaliatory discharge for filing a worker's compensation claim.
See, e.g., Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399 (1988). In addition, a state court
may award damages to a union member against the union for the intentional infliction of emotional distress arising out of the union's discrimination against the member. See Farmer v. United
Bhd. of Carpenters and Joiners of Am. Local 25, 430 U.S. 290 (1977). Finally, state courts may
provide relief against mass picketing and threats of violence. See Automobile Workers v. Russell,
356 U.S. 634 (1958).
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state sovereignty should not be lightly cast aside in the name of "efficiency
and uniformity."
Unfortunately, this is exactly what would be done under the ABA proposal, as well as H.R. 3406. We will use the terms of H.R. 3406 as the focal
point for our discussion. This bill would radically subvert state sovereignty
in "mass tort" cases, first by establishing minimal diversity, and more significantly, by overruling Klaxon, and displacing state choice of law in favor
of a federally-imposed solution. Section 1658 directs the federal courts to
"designat[e] a single jurisdiction whose substantive law is to be applied in
all other actions under section 1367 arising from the same event of [sic]
occurrence."5 3 In addition, the federal courts are not "bound by the choice
of law rules of any State.",5 4 The purpose and effect of the Bill, then, is to
destroy the authority of the state courts to decide "mass tort" cases, and to
determine what substantive law shall apply to the resolution of those cases.
We do not argue that it is improper in all circumstances for Congress to
modify state law applicable to the resolution of disputes between private
persons. In certain limited circumstances, Congress may conclude that national interests require displacement of state law, and that diverse or cumulative imposition of liability in cases with interstate or international
ramifications impose an "undue burden" on interstate commerce.55 Indeed,
one of the authors of this Article has been a proponent of federal products
liability legislation which is specifically targeted to resolve certain problems
that he thinks need resolution at the national level.5 6 Whatever may be
one's views as to the wisdom of federal substantive tort legislation, the ABA
proposal and H.R. 3406 do not seek to establish a national substantive
norm. Where Congress legislates by creating substantive law to resolve a
problem of national significance, it presumably has done so after having
53. H.R. 3406, supra note 3, at E3276.

54. Id. A federally-imposed "single designated jurisdiction" rule is an essential feature of the
ABA proposal as well.
55. The courts have given effect to these principles of preemption. See, e.g., Wood v. General

Motors Corp., 865 F.2d 395, 414 (1st Cir. 1988) (state product liability airbag claim is preempted
by the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act); Cippollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 789

F.2d 181, 187 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1043 (1987) (holding that the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act preempts those state law damage actions relating to smoking

and health that derive from cigarette warnings, advertising or promotion) (preemptive principles
reaffirmed in Cippollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., Nos. 88-5732, 88-5770, 88-5771, 88-5784 (3d Cir.
Jan. 5, 1990) (1990 WL 184)). Preemption applies whether the federal law is embodied in a
statute or a regulation, see Fidelity Federal Say. & Loan Ass'n v. de ]a Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153
(1982), and whether the state law is based on a statute, regulation or common law rule. Taylor v.

General Motors Corp., 875 F.2d 816, 826 (11th Cir. 1989).
56. Twerski, A Moderate and Restrained FederalProduct Liability Bill, Targeting the Crisis

Areas for Resolution, 18 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 575 (1985).
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weighed the merits of the issue, and chosen a national solution to it. By
relying on state substantive law as the measure of the rights of the parties,
the ABA proposal and H.R. 3406 look to a body of the law that is not
national in character. The legislation, in effect, declares the mass tort problem to be a matter of overreaching federal concern, while still presuming
that a "one state solution" is rational. In addition, when the law chosen is
based on irrational choice of law methodology, the affront to federalism is
profound.
B.

Sacrificing State Interests

1. Single Disaster Cases
The radical subversion of state sovereignty effected by H.R. 3406 is dramatically illustrated by the following example. Twenty members of the
Elks Club in Denver, Colorado, charter a bus for a trip to Arizona for an
Elks Convention. The bus company, Colorado Coaches, Inc., is a Colorado
corporation doing business mostly within the state. In Phoenix, thirty Arizona Elks members board the bus for a local sightseeing trip. Due to the
negligence of the bus driver, the bus hits a culvert, causing the bus to overturn. All the passengers suffer serious and debilitating injuries. A Colorado
statute adopted in 1987 limits recovery for non-economic loss to $250,000
for each plaintiffs7 There is no such limitation under Arizona law.
Both the cases of the Colorado plaintiffs and the Arizona plaintiffs give
rise to a conflict of laws problem. This is because in both cases the parties
are not residents of the same state and/or all the legally significant facts did
not occur in the same state. In addition, the laws of the involved states
differ on the point in issue. In the case of the Colorado plaintiffs, although
both the plaintiffs and the defendant are Colorado residents, the accident
occurred in another state, Arizona. In the case of the Arizona plaintiffs,
although the accident occurred in Arizona, the defendant is a resident of a
different state, Colorado. The laws of the involved states differ on the point
in issue, in that Arizona allows unlimited recovery for non-economic loss,
while Colorado limits recovery for non-economic loss to $250,000.8
It is submitted that in these cases a functionally sound result is for the
Arizona plaintiffs to obtain unlimited recovery under Arizona law, but for
the Colorado plaintiffs to be limited to the $250,000 limitation on non-eco57. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-102.5(3)(a) (Supp. 1987) ($500,000 if clear and convincing

evidence, otherwise $250,000).
58. It has been said that in a conflicts case "the legal order tries to integrate the diversity of
which it is composed." Yntema, The HistoricBases of PrivateInternationalLaw, 2 AM. J. CoMP.
L. 297, 297 (1953).
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nomic loss in accordance with Colorado law. In an interstate accident situation, the primarily interested states are the parties' home states, where the
consequences of the accident and of allowing or denying recovery will be
felt by the parties. The Arizona policy of allowing unlimited recovery thus
will always be advanced when the victims are residents of Arizona. The
application of Arizona law to determine liability in the claim of the Arizona
plaintiffs against Colorado Coaches, Inc., is fully fair to the defendant, since
the accident occurred in Arizona on a local sightseeing trip. There is no
doubt that the Arizona plaintiffs will be able to obtain unlimited recovery
there. They will bring suit against Colorado Coaches, Inc. in Arizona,
where the defendant is subject to jurisdiction under the Arizona "long-arm"
act, and Arizona will apply its own law, thus allowing unlimited recovery.59
In the suit between the Colorado plaintiffs and the Colorado defendant,
Colorado law, limiting recovery to $250,000 for non-economic loss, should
likewise apply to determine the rights of the Colorado parties. The Colo59. Under the interest analysis approach to choice of law questions, this case presents the true
conflict situation. The plaintiff's home state has a real interest in applying its law allowing unlimited recovery, since the social and economic consequences of the accident will be felt by the plaintiff in that state. Likewise, the defendant's home state has a real interest in applying its law
denying recovery, since the consequences of imposing liability will be felt by the defendant and its
insurer in that state. Experience indicates that in true conflict situations, the forum, regardless of
the particular approach to choice of law it is purportedly following, will almost invariably apply
its own law in order to implement its own policy and interest. See Sedler, Interest Analysis and
Forum Preference in the Conflict of Laws: A Response to the 'New Critics,' 34 MERCER L. REV.
593, 593-95 (1983); Sedler, The GovernmentalInterest Approach to Choice of Law: An Analysis
and a Reformation, 25 UCLA L. REV. 181, 231-33 (1977). In a case such as this, where a vehicular accident occurred in the plaintiff's home state and the defendant is subject to suit under that
state's long-arm act, the result is so clear that it is difficult to find cases dealing directly with the
question since the defendant would rarely bother to litigate the issue. In Biscoe v. Arlington
County, 738 F.2d 1352 (D.C. Cir. 1984), a police officer from Arlington County in Virginia pursued a suspected bank robber across the District of Columbia line, where he crashed into an
automobile driven by a District of Columbia citizen. Id. at 1354-55. Under Virginia law, the
county enjoyed sovereign immunity. Under District of Columbia law, however, the county would
be liable for the negligence of the officer and could not assert sovereign immunity. In this case,
suit could be brought against the county in the District of Columbia under its long-arm statute.
The court applied District of Columbia law to impose liability. Id. at 1365-66. In the interstate
accident situation, the forum may also apply its own law to impose liability even when an act is
done elsewhere. For example, serving liquor to an intoxicated person in an establishment close to
the state line could foreseeably cause harm to a forum resident in the forum. See, e.g., Bernhard v.
Harrah's Club, 16 Cal. 3d 313, 546 P.2d 719, 128 Cal. Rptr. 215 (1976) (application of California
law imposing "dram shop" liability against a Nevada casino that operated close to the California
state line and advertised extensively in California, when an intoxicated patron of that casino was
involved in an automobile accident with a California victim in California).
Arizona expressly follows the Restatement (Second)'s statement of the most significant relationship approach to choice of law, Bryant v. Silverman, 146 Ariz. 41, 42-44, 703 P.2d 1190, 119193 (1985). Clearly, in this case, Arizona would hold that it has the most significant relationship
with respect to damages recoverable for this accident involving an Arizona victim in Arizona.
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rado legislature has made this determination as to the proper measure of

recovery for non-economic loss. Therefore, Colorado is the only state that
has a real interest in having its law applied to the issue in this case because
the social and economic consequences of the accident, and of imposing or
denying liability, will be felt by the parties there. Thus, Colorado will apply
its own law in the event that suit is brought there,6' and it is likely that if
suit were brought in Arizona, its courts would apply Colorado law in this
case as well.6 1
The result in this situation, then, is that the Colorado plaintiffs would be
limited to $250,000 in damages for non-economic loss in accordance with
Colorado law, because both the plaintiffs and the defendant are residents of
Colorado, and the social and economic consequences of the accident and of
allowing or denying recovery will be felt by the parties in Colorado. The
Arizona plaintiffs, however, would obtain unlimited recovery in accordance
with Arizona law, since they were injured in their home state on a purely
local trip. Such a result (the Colorado plaintiffs being denied unlimited recovery in accordance with Colorado law, and the Arizona plaintiffs obtaining unlimited recovery in accordance with Arizona law) is functionally
sound and fair to all the parties involved. It is irrelevant that the parties

60. See, eg., Fuerste v. Bemis, 156 N.W.2d 831 (Iowa 1968); Tower v. Schwabe, 284 Or. 105,
585 P.2d 662 (1978).
61. In this situation, the non-resident plaintiff can always bring suit in the state where the
accident occurred, obtaining jurisdiction under its "long-arm" act. In a number of cases, the
courts of the accident state have applied their own law, thus allowing recovery. See, e.g.,
Milkovich v. Saari, 295 Minn. 155, 203 N.W.2d 408 (1973); Gagne v. Berry, 112 N.H. 125, 290
A.2d 624 (1972); Conklin v. Homer, 38 Wis. 2d 468, 157 N.W.2d 579 (1968). In some cases,
however, the court of the accident state has concluded that it has no real interest in applying its
law allowing recovery, and has applied the law of the parties' home state, thus denying recovery.
See, e.g., Vick v. Cochran, 316 So. 2d 242 (Miss. 1975); Mager v. Mager, 197 N.W.2d 626 (N.D.
1972). In New York, when the parties are from the same state, the law of the home state applies
under the first "Neumeier rule." See Neumeier v. Kuehner, 31 N.Y.2d 121, 286 N.E.2d 454, 335
N.Y.S.2d 64 (1972); see also Schultz v. Boy Scouts of Am., 65 N.Y.2d 189, 480 N.E.2d 679
(1985).
Arizona, which expressly follows the state of the most significant relationship approach to
choice of law, would hold that in this case the parties' home state was the state of the most
significant relationship on the issue of damages recoverable. In Bryant, the court held that where
Arizona parties were involved in a fatal accident in Colorado, Arizona was the state of the most
significant relationship on the issue of damages recoverable for wrongful death. In that context it
observed as follows: "Although Colorado is the state of injury, the state where the injury occurs
does not have a strong interest in compensation if the injured party is a non-resident. Compensation of an injured plaintiff is primarily a concern of the state in which plaintiff is domiciled."
Bryant, 146 Ariz. at 45, 703 P.2d at 1194 (citations omitted). For the same reasons, Arizona
would have no real interest in allowing unlimited compensation for non-economic loss to a Colorado victim injured by a Colorado0defendant in Arizona, and so would likely hold that Colorado
is the state of the most significant relationship on this issue.
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were victims in the same "mass tort." The "mass" nature of the tort has
nothing to do with the consequences of that tort for the individual victims
and with the interest of the victims' home states in applying their law to
determine the rights of the victims. The consequences of this "mass tort"
will be felt by the victims in their home states, and it is the law of their
respective home states that should determine the amount of damages they
will each recover for this "mass tort."
The intrusion of a federally imposed "single designated jurisdiction"
rule, however, would require the federal court to either deny the Arizona
plaintiffs unlimited recovery or, more likely,6 2 grant the Colorado plaintiffs
a "windfall." This would not be permitted according to the law of their
home state. There exists no reason to deny the Colorado defendant the
protection of the law which the Colorado legislature sought to bestow upon
it while granting to Colorado plaintiffs a "windfall" denied to them by the
legislature of their home state. The application of the "single designated
jurisdiction" rule in this case, therefore, not only runs counter to progressive trends in choice of law, but unjustifiably defeats the strong policy of
Colorado, in the case of the Colorado parties, without advancing any legitimate policy of Arizona. Again, if the Arizona courts were permitted to
retain control over this case, they would likely respect the legitimate policy
and interest of Colorado and displace Arizona law in favor of Colorado law
on the point in issue.
We submit, therefore, that proper regard for the traditional sovereignty
of the states in our federal system dictates that Colorado law govern the
rights of the Colorado plaintiffs and the Colorado defendant, while Arizona
law govern the rights of the Arizona plaintiffs and Colorado defendant arising out of an Arizona accident. This regard for state sovereignty is
thwarted, however, by the "designated single jurisdiction" rule of H.R.
3406.
In arguing for the consolidation of "mass tort" litigation and the application of a federally imposed "single designated jurisdiction" rule to govern
all the cases arising from the "mass tort," the American Bar Association
Commission on Mass Torts has stated that:
separate adjudication of individual tort claims arising from a single
accident or use of or exposure to the same product or substance is
inefficient and wasteful, seriously burdens both state and federal judicial systems, poses unacceptably high risks of inconsistent results,

62. It surely seems unjust to deprive the Arizona plaintiffs of the benefit of unlimited recovery
under Arizona law for an accident occurring on a local trip simply because some of the victims

were from Colorado.
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and contributes to public dissatisfaction with the tort law system
and the legal profession.6 3
The Report, however, fails to demonstrate empirical evidence that the present system of "mass tort" litigation produces any of these claimed harmful
effects. Rather, the Report focuses on the difficulty of consolidating the
"mass tort" cases in a single court to be governed by a single law, and
simply assumes that all of these alleged harmful effects resultfrom this difficulty. In addition, nowhere in the Report is there consideration of the effect
consolidation and resolution of the "mass tort" cases under a federally imposed "single designated jurisdiction" rule would have on the traditional
sovereignty of the states in our federal system, and the longstanding function of the states to develop the legal rules that govern disputes between
private persons and to adjudicate such disputes in their courts. It is simply
assumed that state sovereignty must be shunted aside in the name of "efficiency and uniformity of result" in "mass tort" litigation.
Let us now look at the Colorado-Arizona bus trip "mass tort" case and
examine how the cases would be handled under the present system of tort
litigation. This system relies primarily on state law and the state courts to
determine the rights and liabilities of the parties involved in interstate accidents, "mass tort" or otherwise. The Arizona plaintiffs would doubtless file
their suits against the Colorado defendant in the Arizona courts, where that
defendant is subject to jurisdiction under the Arizona "long-arm" act. They
will not file their suits in Colorado, not only because of possible inconvenience in doing so, but because there is a real possibility that Colorado would
apply its own law in order to protect the Colorado defendant.' If the
plaintiffs file separate actions, the Arizona courts would have the power to
consolidate them, so the "efficiency" problem is rectified.6"
The Colorado plaintiffs are also likely to sue in Arizona, hoping to obtain the application of Arizona law as the law of the state of injury instead
of the less favorable law of their home state. Again, all of their cases could
be consolidated with the cases of the Arizona plaintiffs, and there could be a
63. ABA Mass Torts Report, supra note 1, at 12.
64. Whenever a recovery state plaintiff has sued a non-recovery state defendant in the defend-

ant's home state, the courts of the defendant's home state have always applied their own law to
deny or limit recovery, including the rare situation where the accident occurred in the plaintiff's
home state. For a discussion and review of pertinent cases, see Sedler, Rules of Choice of Law
Versus Choice-of-Law Rules: Judicial Method in Conflicts Torts Cases, 44 TENN. L. Rtv. 975,

1037-38 (1977).
65. As long as all plaintiffs are from Arizona, there is complete diversity and the case could
be removed to federal court. The federal court, however, is required to apply Arizona law and to
reach the same result that would be reached in the Arizona state courts; here the application of
Arizona substantive law on the issue of recovery for non-economic loss.
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single trial on the issue of liability.6 6 Therefore, the "efficiency" concern is
satisfied. If liability is established, there would have to be separate trials on
the issue of damages for each plaintiff as there is under H.R. 3406. Consequently, the Colorado plaintiffs would be limited to $250,000 for non-economic loss in accordance with Colorado law.
The fact that the Arizona plaintiffs would recover greater damages than
the Colorado plaintiffs for harm arising out of the same accident would
mean that there would be "inconsistent results" in the recovery arising
from the same "mass tort." It is difficult to understand why this creates
any kind of problem. The "inconsistent results" are due to the fact that the
parties' home states have different rules as to the amount of damages recoverable. These are also the states where the consequences of the accident and
of imposing or denying liability will be felt by the parties. Once the reason
for the "inconsistent results" is understood, it cannot be said to be "unacceptable" to limit each victim to the measure of recovery afforded by the
law of the victim's home state. Surely, such a result is preferable to imposing a "choice of law straightjacket" that would improperly intrude on the
power of Arizona to apply its substantive law for the benefit of the Arizona
victims. This would also impair Colorado's ability to implement the rule of
the Colorado Legislature: recovery for non-economic loss should be limited
in a case involving Colorado plaintiffs and a Colorado defendant.
In the Arizona-Colorado bus trip example, the present system achieves
substantially the same "efficiency" that would be achieved under H.R. 3406
without intruding upon the power of each state to apply its own law to
determine the rights of its resident plaintiffs.
2.

Multi-Exposure Cases

Consider next the matter of multi-exposure product liability cases.
While this kind of litigation is not included within the present scope of H.R.
3406, it is included in the recommendations of the ABA Report. 67 The
ABA Report refers to "toxic tort litigation," which it defines as "claims
that use of or exposure to a product (including pharmaceutical drugs or
medical devices) has produced an illness or condition," and says that
"claims of this sort have sometimes mushroomed into tort litigation of gi-

66. In this case, the laws of the states involved do not differ on the issue of liability.
67. The ABA Mass Torts Report contemplates that the applicable law should be that of a
'single designated jurisdiction," but authorizes the federal court to select the law of more than
one state to govern in particular "mass tort" litigation. See supra notes 14-17 and accompanying

text.
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gantic proportion as illustrated by litigation involving Agent Orange,
Benedictin, DES, vaccines and asbestos.""8
Under the present system, in "toxic tort litigation," the victims may
bring individual or class actions against the manufacturer (or manufacturers) in any state where the manufacturer is subject to jurisdiction. Therefore, these actions can always be brought in the victim's home state6 9 or in
the state of manufacture.7" If there is complete diversity, the actions can be
brought in or removed to federal court. While the state court cases brought
in a single state can be consolidated to varying degrees under the rules governing multi-district litigation, in all cases, the applicable conflicts law will
be that of the state in which the original suit was brought.
Let us assume that separate actions are brought by the "toxic tort" victims against the manufacturer in all fifty states. In each case, the forum is
either the plaintiff's home state or the state of manufacture. Let us also
assume that there are significant variations in the laws of the different states
on the various issues involved in products liability litigation, such as the
standard of liability, causation, punitive damages, and the like. The law of
half the states is more favorable to plaintiffs on these issues, while the laws
of the other states favor manufacturers. Also, assume that the law of the
state of the manufacturer is more favorable to manufacturers. 1 While the
actions against the manufacturer in each of the fifty states can be consolidated within the state, and the federal court cases can be consolidated to a
degree under the multi-district litigation rules, there will be in excess of fifty
cases in different courts involving the same underlying claim.
Consider now the likely results of these cases. Where the law of the
plaintiffs' home state is more favorable to plaintiffs, the plaintiffs will sue in
their home states, which will apply their own laws favoring plaintiffs. Because the consequences of the accident will be felt by the victims in their
68. ABA Mass Torts Report, supra note 1, at 8.
69. Almost invariably the product will have been purchased in the victim's home state, and
the harm will have occurred there.
70. Frequently, the product will have been designed, tested, and manufactured in the state
where the manufacturer has its principal place of business. If different "batches" of the product
were manufactured in different states, each state is the state of manufacture for these purposes.
Suit may also be brought in any state where the manufacturer does business, subject to forum
non conveniens considerations. Where the state in which the manufacturer is sued is not the state
where the plaintiff resides or where anything relating to the design, testing or manufacture of the
product occurred - that is, where the only connection that the manufacturer has with the forum
is that the manufacturer carries on unrelated business activities there - the strongest justification
for dismissal on forum non conveniens grounds is presented. See, e.g., Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert,
330 U.S. 501 (1947); In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster, 809 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1987).
71. The laws of all states where "batches" of the product were manufactured will be, for our
purposes, more favorable to the manufacturer on these issues.
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home states, these states have a real interest in applying their plaintiff-favoring law for the benefit of their resident plaintiffs.7 2 In the remaining cases,
where the law of the plaintiffs' home state is favorable to manufacturers,
there is simply no conflict of laws on the point in issue, since the law of the
state of manufacture is favorable to manufacturers.
Now let us assume that the law of the state of manufacture is more
favorable to plaintiffs. In this situation, there is again a conflict of laws
between the law of the state of manufacture and the law of the plaintiffs'
home state. This time, however, the law of the plaintiffs' home state favors
manufacturers, while the law of the manufacturer's home state favors plaintiffs. The plaintiffs are likely to bring their suits in the manufacturer's home
state, hoping to persuade that court to apply its own law. They will argue
that the state's product liability law reflects a regulatory policy, which that
state is interested in applying to products manufactured there. Sometimes,
the courts of the manufacturer's home state will agree, and will apply their
own law.73 Other times they will hold that the law of the plaintiff's home
state should apply.7 4 More to the point, so long as the suits are brought in
the manufacturer's home state, it may be possible to consolidate them. By
doing this, the liability issues may be determined in a single action. Multiple litigation will occur in this circumstance only if some plaintiffs bring the
suits in their home states.
It cannot be disputed that, under the present system, there will be multiple litigation on the same underlying "mass toxic tort" claim. The multiple
litigation will lead to "inconsistent results" because of the differing applica72. Again, this is the true conflict situation, with the plaintiff from a liability state and the
defendant from a non-liability state. Since the manufacturer shipped the goods into the "stream
of commerce," the application of the law of any of the fifty states was foreseeable to the manufacturer at the time it acted and, therefore, it is manifestly fair to the manufacturer. Since the plaintiff's home state has a real interest in applying its own law in order to implement the victim
protection policy reflected in that law, and the application of its law is fair to the manufacturer,
the plaintiff's home state will apply its own law regardless of which specific approach to choice of
law it is purportedly following. See, e.g., Stephan v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 110 N.H. 248, 266

A.2d 855 (1970); see also R. SEDLER,
TO YOUR PRACTICE 58-59 (1989).

ACROSS STATE LINES: APPLYING THE CONFLICT OF LAWS

As a practical matter, the out-of-state manufacturer, sued in
the plaintiff's home state, will assume that the forum will apply its own law, which is more
favorable to the plaintiff. The only way that the manufacturer can avoid this result is to contest
jurisdiction, which will ordinarily be unavailing, since the manufacturer, by shipping the goods
into the "stream of commerce," has "purposefully avail[ed] itself of the privilege of conducting
[business] activities" in all fifty states and "purposefully directed its activities at residents" of all
fifty states. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474-75 (1985) (quoting Hansen v.
Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)).
73. See, e.g., Corrigan v. Bjork Shiley Corp., 182 Cal. App. 3d 166, 227 Cal. Rptr. 247 (1986).
74. See, e.g., Deemer v. Silk City Textile Mach. Co., 193 N.J. Super. 643, 475 A.2d 648 (App.
Div. 1984); Morgan v. Biro Mfg., 15 Ohio St. 2d 339, 474 N.E.2d 286 (1984).
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ble law when the law in some of the plaintiffs' home states is more favorable
to plaintiffs and the law of the state of manufacture is more favorable to
manufacturers. In this situation, the plaintiffs residing in states whose law
is more favorable to plaintiffs will sue in their home states, and the home
state will apply its own law for the benefit of its resident plaintiffs. The
plaintiffs residing in the states whose law is more favorable to manufacturers will not have any applicable law advantage. However, as long as there
can be multiple litigation in different states on the same underlying claim,
there is also the possibility of "inconsistent results" due to different dispositions. Juries in different states, operating under the same applicable law,
may resolve questions of fact and liability differently.
Admittedly, it would be efficient to consolidate all of the actions in a
single court and apply the law of a single state to determine liability under a
federally imposed "single designated jurisdiction" rule. This "efficiency
and uniformity benefit" would be achieved, however, by displacing state
sovereignty in a vital area of regulation that under our constitutional system
has been traditionally reserved to the states. As a result, many of these
cases would be taken away from the state courts.7 5 Additionally, the application of the "single designated jurisdiction" rule, resulting in the application of the law of the state of manufacture to govern all claims,76 would
prevent states with plaintiff-favoring rules from applying their law for the
benefit of their own residents.
The "inefficiencies" in multiple litigation of the same underlying claim
in different courts are "built-into" our federal system. The states have the
primary responsibility for developing the legal rules that govern disputes
between private persons, and adjudicating those disputes in their courts.
The proponents of consolidation should bear a heavy burden of showing
that these "inefficiencies" are so serious and place such a severe strain on
judicial resources as to justify removing these cases from the state courts
and consolidating them in a single federal action.
75. This deprives the plaintiffs' home state of the power to provide a forum for its resident
plaintiffs to sue to redress an injury suffered in the home state, and likewise deprives the state of
manufacture of the power to provide a forum in which claims against the manufacturer could be
litigated.
76. As will be demonstrated in the next section of the Article, in a "mass toxic tort" situation,
the law of the state of manufacture is the only law that could constitutionallybe applied to govern
the claims of all the plaintiffs residing in different states. This result would also encourage manufacturers engaged in high risk activity to carry on their manufacturing in states with rules that
protect manufacturers.
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C. The Costs of Uniformity: A Retrospective
Even if the proponents of consolidation can sustain this burden, it is one
thing to consolidate the "mass toxic tort" claims in a single federal action,
and quite another thing to displace the authority of each state to prescribe
the choice of law rules governing "toxic tort" claims that have been brought
initially in their courts. The consolidation proposal would be less objectionable, with respect to state sovereignty, if, after consolidation, the federal
court were required, as it is now, to apply the conflicts law of the state in
which the suit was initially brought.77
Abandonment of the "single designated jurisdiction" rule would reduce
some of the "efficiencies," since different substantive laws would apply to
the claims of different classes of plaintiffs. In our "mass toxic tort" example, the liability issues in the cases involving plaintiffs from states with
plaintiff-favoring laws would have to be tried separately from the liability
issues in the cases involving plaintiffs from states with manufacturer-favoring laws. This loss in "efficiency," however, seems a small price to pay for
preserving the sovereignty of the states in determining the law applicable to
resolving disputes between private persons, and for respecting the interests
of the states with plaintiff-favoring laws.
It appears, however, that "uniformity of result" is also a major objective
of proponents of consolidation, as evidenced by the "single designated jurisdiction" rule embodied in H.R. 3406.78 In the "mass toxic tort" example,
the "uniformity of result" objective would be achieved at the expense of
sacrificing the interests of the states with laws favoring plaintiffs. As we
have said, under the "single designated jurisdiction" rule, it is likely that
the law of the state of manufacture would be chosen to govern all of the
claims. Plaintiffs from states with plaintiff-favoring laws would, therefore,
be denied the protection afforded them by the law of their home state.
"Inconsistency of result" in the "mass toxic tort" situation, as in the
Colorado-Arizona bus accident discussed earlier, exists because different
states, in the exercise of their traditional sovereignty, have adopted different
77. Under Klaxon v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941), the federal court must
apply the conflicts law of the state in which it sits, and when a case is transferred from one federal
court to another under 28 U.S.C. § 1404, the transferee court must apply the law that would have
been applied by the transferring court if the case had remained there, regardless of which party

initiated transfer. See Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612 (1964); Ferens v. John Deere Co., U.S. -,

110 S. Ct. 1274 (1990).

78. H.R. 3406, supra note 3.
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substantive rules in the products liability area. 79 Different results reached
by state courts in determining the legal rights of private persons in litigation
is, as the Supreme Court has observed, "part of the price of our federal
system." 8 A requirement that the applicable law in all "multi-exposure
product liability" cases be that of a "single designated jurisdiction" would
radically alter the role of the states in our federal system by displacing state
authority to promulgate the rules governing disputes between private persons in such cases. The proponents of "uniformity of result" simply cannot,
by any stretch of the imagination, demonstrate why such "uniformity" is so
necessary as to require this radical alteration of the states' traditional role in
our federal system.
It is clear that both the ABA Report and H.R. 3406 give scant consideration to the impact of federally mandated consolidation and a federally imposed "single jurisdiction rule" on the traditional sovereignty exercised by
the states. The effect of these proposals would radically alter the role of the
states in our federal system by displacing state authority to promulgate
rules governing disputes between private persons in "mass tort" cases and
adjudicate such cases in their courts. Fundamental federalism considerations strongly militate against their adoption by Congress.8 1
Lastly, the significance of Klaxon to federalism under modem choice of
law methodology must be carefully considered. Originally, Klaxon sought
only to assure that the result of a law suit not be altered depending on
whether suit was brought in a state or federal court. Under modem conflicts theory, state choice of law rules reflect deep felt views as to the implementation of state interests. The state interests which are in conflict in
modem day tort litigation are substantial. The tort reform movement continues to be the subject of violent disagreement among state legislatures.
Those states that have passed reform legislation have often set forth the
79. "Inconsistency of result" in cases resolved under the same substantive law exists because
juries in different states and possibly in different cases in the same state, have reached different
results when adjudicating the same issue.
80. Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 302 (1942). Differences in the applicable law
also represent the power of each state to experiment with solutions to legal questions, such as
liability for defective products. As Justice Brandeis cautioned:
Denial of the right to experiment may be fraught with serious consequences to the Nation.
It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if
its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments
without risk to the rest of the country.
New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Justice Brandeis' statement was made while arguing that the due process clause should not be used to invalidate state economic regulation. This view eventually prevailed. See, e.g., North Dakota State Bd.
of Pharmacy v. Snyders' Drug Stores, Inc., 414 U.S. 156 (1973).
81. See supra text accompaning notes 1-3.
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goals of the legislation in lengthy preambles. 2 Unlike the speculation that
often attends choice of law analysis, there is no need to guess as to what
policy goals were sought to be achieved. Similarly, those states that continue to champion the rights of claimants by refusing to limit traditional
tort liability have strong views as to the appropriate public policy in this
vitally important area of law. In effect "interest analysis" has "Erie-ized"
Klaxon. Thus, it is not merely Klaxon which is under attack, but the basic
philosophy of Erie. The assault on federalism is very deep indeed.
III.

MANDATING IRRATIONAL CHOICE OF LAW

Requiring that all issues in a "mass tort" case be determined by the law
of a "single designated jurisdiction" would have the effect, in practice, of
defeating the legitimate interests of states in applying their own law in
"mass tort" cases. It would also run counter to progressive trends in choice
of law, and impose a "choice of law straightjacket" in "mass tort" cases.
At the heart of H.R. 3406 is a provision for a federally imposed choice
of the substantive law of a "single designated jurisdiction" to govern the
resolution of all liability claims in a "mass tort" case. 3 Section 6 is the key
provision. This provision authorizes the federal court in which the "mass
tort" cases have been consolidated to "determine the source of the applicable substantive law," and specifically provides that, in making this determination, the court "shall not be bound by the choice of law rules of any state
... ,,4 The section sets forth a long list of factors that the court may
consider in choosing the "single designated jurisdiction," which on the surface would seem to allow for flexibility in making a functionally sound
choice of law decision.
We shall demonstrate, however, that the very opposite is true. The
court has almost no flexibility at all because the long list of factors is simply
a mirage. Because of constitutional constraints on what state's law can be
selected to apply in a conflicts case, the court's choice of the "single desig82. See, eg.,

N.D.

§ 6-5-500 to -520 (1989 Supp.); CAL. CIV. CODE § 143.1 (1986);
§ 28-01.1-01 (1989 Supp.); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-15-2 (1989 as amended)

ALA. CODE

CENT. CODE

(The Utah Act was declared unconstitutional in 1985, but has been revived by the 1989 Utah
Laws S.B. 25. By the addition of a severability clause the legislature has apparently cured the
problem occasioned by the unconstitutional statute of limitation-repose provision).
83. The ABA proposal also strives to have all liability issues determined by the law of a
"single designated jurisdiction," but recognizes that in some circumstances it may be necessary to
look to the substantive law of more than one state. There appears to be a similar escape hatch in
H.R. 3406, § 6, 1658(b). See H.R. 3406, supra note 3, at E3276. In truth, neither the ABA
proposal nor H.R. 3406 has considered the implications of trying to have all the liability issues in

a "mass tort" case determined by the law of a particular state or states.
84. H.R. 3406, supra note 3, at E3276.
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natedjurisdiction"is very limited. As a practical matter, in the vast majority of cases, the court will be forced to choose either the totally discredited
"law of the place of the wrong" rule of the First Restatement, or an equally
rigid rule of "law of the place of conduct."8 5 In some cases the court will
simply "run out of law." There will be no "single designated jurisdiction"
whose law could constitutionally be applied to govern all the claims in the
"mass tort" case.
The reason for this anomalous, unsound, and self-defeating choice of
law result is the interaction of the "single designated jurisdiction" concept
with constitutional constraints on choice of law in a conflicts case. The due
process and full faith and credit clauses of the Constitution impose certain
minimal limits on which state's law can be selected to apply in a conflicts
case. While these limits ordinarily will not prevent a state court from making a decision to apply its own law or the law of another state in a particular
case,86 these limits become restrictive when an effort is made to apply the
substantive law of a "single designated jurisdiction" in a "mass tort" case.

This is especially true when multiple plaintiffs reside in a number of different states, and where the conduct in question occurs in more than one
state.87
85. The "law of the place of the wrong," which has long been rejected due to its rigidity,
stems from the REsTATEMENT (FIRsT) OF CONFLICTS OF LAW § 377 (1934). The "law of the

place of conduct," as the only other constitutionally permissible alternative, is just as rigid. See
infra notes 86-99 and accompanying text.
86. See Sedler, ConstitutionalLimitations on Choice of Law: The Perspectiveof Constitutional
Generalism, 10 HOESTRA L. REv. 59, 68-74 (1981).
87. The impact of Allstate and Shutts (see cites infra notes 88, 92) on both the ABA proposal
and H.R. 3604 was the subject of almost no discussion in the text of the ABA Mass Torts Report.
It was first raised in the Congressional Hearings on H.R. 3604 in written testimony submitted by
the authors to the Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual Property and Administration of Justice,
Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives on November 15, 1989. Several
scholarly sources referenced in the footnotes to the ABA Mass Torts Report have considered the
problem in one fashion or another. For example, Professor Mullenix simply assumes that the only
method to bypass the complex choice of law problems engendered by single forum litigation of
mass tort claims is either for the judiciary to adopt federal common law or for Congress to adopt
substantive tort law provisions to govern mass tort cases. See Mullenix, Class Resolution of the
Mass-Tort Case: A Proposed FederalProcedureAct, 64 TEx. L. REv. 1039, 1075-79 (1986). It
will be recalled that both the ABA proposal and H.R. 3604 specifically eschew such an approach.
Professors Rowe and Sibley, whose work had a significant influence on both the ABA and the
drafters of H.R. 3604, address choice of law as an afterthought. Although the authors advocate
the legislative overruling of Klaxon in mass torts cases, and development of federal choice of law
principles through use of an extensive list of factors, the authors indicate no awareness that Shutts
limits the practical choices available to a federal court seeking to use a "single jurisdiction rule."
Rowe & Sibley, Beyond Diversity FederalMultiparty, Multiforum Jurisdiction, 135 U. PA. L.
REv. 7, 37-44 (1986).
Professors Miller and Crump recognize that the drafting of a federal choice of law statute for
multiparty, multistate federal jurisdiction case presents serious difficulties. Yet, the authors have
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The constitutional test for the application of a state's law in a conflicts
case was stated by the Supreme Court in Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague,88
as follows: "[F]or a State's substantive law to be selected in a constitutionally permissible manner, that State must have a significant contact or significant aggregation of contacts, creating state interests, such that choice of its
law is neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair."8 9 Under this test, a
state's law may be constitutionally applied where the state has an interest in
applying its law in order to implement the policy reflected in that law, and
the application of its law is not fundamentally unfair to the other party, or
where the state has sufficient factual contacts with the underlying transaction, so that it is reasonable for its law to be applied on the basis of those
contacts. 90 Where the application of a state's law cannot be justified either
under an "interest and fairness" test or a "factual contacts" test, such application is "arbitrary" and thus, constitutionally impermissible. 91
In Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts,9 2 the Supreme Court held that in
multi-party claims the constitutional test controls the application of a
state's law to the claim of each individualparty, notwithstanding that the
suit takes the form of a "nationwide class action." In Shutts, a class action
was brought in Kansas, by royalty owners residing in all fifty states, against
a natural gas producer that produced or purchased natural gas from leased
land, located in eleven different states. Plaintiffs claimed an entitlement to
interest on suspended royalty payments. The Kansas court applied Kansas
substantive law to all of the claims in the case, although over ninety-nine
percent of the gas leases were located in other states, and ninety-seven percent of the plaintiffs were non-residents. The Supreme Court held that the
application of Kansas law to determine all of the claims was "sufficiently
arbitrary and unfair as to exceed constitutional limits." 93
Kansas tried to justify the application of Kansas law in this case on the
ground that it took the form of a "nationwide class action," in which Kansas was the forum. The Supreme Court rejected this justification as being
not directly considered the rather commonplace hypothetical presented herein and the relationship between a "single jurisdiction rule" and constitutional law principles. See Miller & Crump,
Jurisdiction and Choice of Law in Multistate Class Actions After Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts,
96 YALE L.J. 1, 78-79 (1986).

88. 449 U.S. 302 (1981).
89. Id. at 312-13. While the above test was set forth in a plurality opinion in Allstate, it was

subsequently endorsed by the full Court in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 818-19
(1985).
90. See Sedler supra note 86, at 72-74.

91. For a thorough discussion of this point see Sedler, supra note 86, at 85-92.
92. Phillips Petroleum Co., 472 U.S. 797 (1985).

93. Id. at 822.
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contrary to the limits on selection of a state's law that had been set forth in
Allstate. The Court noted that those limits "must be respected even in a
nationwide class action." 94 Since Kansas had no interest in applying its law
to claims unrelated to Kansas and, of course, no factual connection with
those claims, the application of Kansas law to determine those claims was
unconstitutional.
H.R. 3406 has the effect of converting a "mass tort" case into a "nationwide class action" and requires the federal court to select a "single jurisdiction's substantive law" to govern all the claims. As Shutts makes clear,
however, the fact that a "nationwide class action" was involved is irrelevant
with respect to constitutional limitations on selection of the applicable law.
The constitutional limitations on selection of a state's law apply to the claim
of each individual party.
The interaction of the "law of a single designated jurisdiction" approach
of H.R. 3406, with constitutional constraints on choice of law in multiparty
claims, will force the federal court into a "choice of law straightjacket."
This effect is clearly illustrated by the following typical "mass tort" case.
One hundred fifty California residents leave Los Angeles on a flight to New
York, with a stopover in Detroit, Michigan. In Detroit, another twenty-five
passengers, all from Michigan, embark for the last leg of the flight to New
York. The aircraft, manufactured by Gruman Aircraft in New York,
crashes on take-off from the Detroit airport, killing all on board. The allegation is that the crash was due to a design defect in the landing gear. Under
the law of California, as announced in Barker v. Lull EngineeringCo.,9" if a
plaintiff demonstrates that an alleged design defect is the cause of the injury, the burden shifts to the defendant to prove that under risk-utility
guidelines the product was not defective. It is widely acknowledged that the
California rule is extremely favorable to plaintiffs and effectively imposes
strict liability for design defect. Under Michigan and New York law, the
burden of proof, that the product was defective, is on the plaintiff. If the
product conformed to the state-of-the-art at the time of manufacture, the
manufacturer is relieved from liability. Thus, for all practical purposes,
under Michigan and New York law, a manufacturer can be held liable only
for negligence.
The Supreme Court set forth the constitutional test for the selection of a
state's law in Allstate. Thus, in this situation, California law could be applied to determine the tort claims of the California survivors against
Gruman Aircraft, since California has an interest in applying its law to
94. Id. at 823.
95. 29 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978).
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determine the claims of the California survivors. Furthermore, the application of California law is not unfair to Gruman Aircraft, which has a large
number of airplanes flying in California, including the airplane involved in
the fatal crash.9 6 For the same reason, Michigan law could be applied to
determine the claims of the Michigan survivors, and of the California survivors as well, since the accident occurred there. New York law likewise
could be applied to determine all of these claims, since the airplane was
designed and manufactured in New York.9 7
However, under the constitutional test, California law could not be applied to determine the claims of the survivors of Michigan residents. With
regard to their claims, California has no factual contacts with the underlying transaction. Thus, the mere presence of a single non-California victim,
who boarded the plane outside of California, precludes the application of
California law to determine the claims of the California survivors. This
amounts to a "single plaintiff veto" on an otherwise functionally sound
choice of law result, and defeats the strong interest of California in applying
its rule favoring plaintiffs for the benefit of the California victims. Since one
state's law must be chosen under the "single designated jurisdiction" rule, it
cannot be that of California, but a rule from Michigan or New York favoring defendants.
In this example, constitutional constraints on the selection of a state's
law, interacting with the "single designated jurisdiction" requirement, combine to produce a patently unsound and unfair result. California has a real
interest in applying its own law to implement the policy favoring plaintiffs
reflected in that law, and would do so if suit were brought in California.
California is precluded from advancing its own policy and interest because
of the fact that some of the victims boarded the airplane in Michigan.
Such a patently unsound and unfair result could also occur in a "mass
tort" arising from a simple bus crash that involves two states. Consider the
following example: Twenty-five Wisconsin senior citizens embark on a
three-day trip to Indiana on Greyhound Tours.9 8 While the group is in
Indiana, a friend of one of the members of the Wisconsin group joins the
tour for the day. While traveling in Indiana, the bus is involved in a collision with a car driven by an Indiana resident, seriously injuring all of the
96. In practice, the survivors of the California victims would bring their suit against Gruman

in California, and it is likely that California would apply its rule favoring plaintiffs for the benefit
of the survivors.
97. As regards the survivors of the Michigan victims, there is no conflict of laws on the point
in issue between the law of the victims' home state, where the accident occurred, and the law of
the state of manufacture.
98. For these purposes, Greyhound Tours is properly considered a Wisconsin party.
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passengers. Both the driver of the bus and the driver of the Indiana car
were negligent; however, the Indiana driver was driving twenty-five miles
per hour over the speed limit. The allocation of fault between the parties is
thirty percent to Greyhound and seventy percent to the Indiana driver. Indiana is one of ten states that has abolished joint-tortfeasor liability, while
Wisconsin retains the traditional common-law joint tortfeasor doctrine.
The driver of the Indiana car carries only $500,000 of liability insurance
and has no other significant assets. That amount is $10,000,000 short of the
amount necessary to compensate the seriously injured plaintiffs. Greyhound has adequate insurance to cover all claims.
If Indiana law applies, the twenty-five Wisconsin residents will be limited to thirty percent recovery against Greyhound. Since the liability of
Greyhound is several, rather than joint, it is responsible only for its share of
the fault. If Wisconsin law applies, this limitation would not operate to
reduce recovery, because of joint and several liability. There is no doubt
that the Wisconsin plaintiffs would bring suit against Greyhound in Wisconsin, and Wisconsin would apply its law, thereby imposing full liability
against Greyhound. However, under the "single designated jurisdiction"
rule of H.R. 3406, the federal court could not constitutionally select Wisconsin law in this case. Since one of the plaintiffs is from Indiana and the
accident occurred in Indiana, involving an Indiana driver, Wisconsin law
could not constitutionally be selected to govern the claim of the Indiana
plaintiff against the Indiana driver.9 9 Thus, in this "mass tort" case, only
Indiana can be the "single designated jurisdiction" whose law can be constitutionally applicable to govern the claims of all the plaintiffs. The result
prevents Wisconsin law from being applicable in governing the liability of
Greyhound Tours as to the Wisconsin plaintiffs, and does not allow Wisconsin to apply its law and implement the policy reflected in that law.
In an earlier discussion, we utilized a "toxic tort" hypothetical to
demonstrate how the substantial interests of states in their domiciliaries
would be sacrificed under the suggested mass tort proposals.1 °° We now
call on that same hypothetical to demonstrate how constitutional constraints will force the courts to choose the law of the state of manufacture to
the detriment of plaintiffs. In our hypothetical case we assumed separate
actions brought by "toxic tort" victims against a manufacturer in all fifty
states. We further assumed that the law of half of the states favored plaino

99. Wisconsin has no interest in applying its law to allow recovery to an Indiana victim
against an Indiana driver where the accident involving that victim had no factual contacts with
Wisconsin.
100. See supra text accompanying notes 67-76.
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tiffs on various issues in products liability litigation, and the law of the other
states favored manufacturers. The law of the state of manufacture was
more favorable to manufacturers.
To simplify things, we will have one group of victims living in California, another group of victims living in Michigan, and the product manufactured in New York. The matter in issue is California's burden-shifting rule
in design defect claims, discussed in connection with the California-Michigan airplane crash. Again, the law of California could not be constitutionally selected to govern the claims of the Michigan victims, since California
would have no interest in applying its law for the benefit of Michigan victims injured in their home state. The only state's law that could be constitutionally selected to govern the claims of all the "toxic tort" victims is the
law of the state of manufacture, New York, with its manufacturer-protecting rule. New York is the only state having factual contacts with the underlying transaction with respect to the claims of all the victims residing in
different states. In addition, the state of one group of victims would have
no interest in applying its plaintiff-favoring rule for a group of victims residing in another state.
The "mass toxic tort" situation can also be used to demonstrate the
point that in some cases, there is no "single designated jurisdiction" whose
law could be constitutionally selected to govern the claims of all the victims.
This will occur in the case in which different manufacturers, operating in
different states, are sought to be held liable to groups of victims residing in
different states, on the same underlying "toxic tort" claim. We will assume
that the point in issue relates to determining liability on the basis of "market share." Again, to simplify things, one group of victims resides in State
A and another group in State B. One company manufactured the product
in State C, and another manufactured the product in State D.
On the issue of "market share" liability, the laws of State A and State C
favor victims, while the laws of State B and State D favor manufacturers.
Assuming that both manufacturers do business nationwide, the law of State
A could be constitutionally selected to govern the claims of the State A
victims against both manufacturers, but the law of State A could not be
constitutionally selected to govern the claims of the State B victims, and
vice-versa. The law of State C could constitutionally be selected to govern
the claims of both the State A and the State B victims against the State C
manufacturer, but could not constitutionally be s~lected to govern their
claims against the State D manufacturer. Nor could the law of State D be
selected to govern the claims against the State C manufacturer. In this case,
because of constitutional constraints, we have "run out of law." There is no
"single designated jurisdiction" whose law could constitutionally be se-
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lected to govern the claims of all the victims residing in different states
against defendants who manufactured the product in different states.
IV.

AD

Hoc

VARIANCE FROM THE SINGLE JURISDICTION RULE

Both the ABA proposal and H.R. 3406 would allow the federal court to
override the single-jurisdiction rule on an ad hoc basis. Although these provisions can be seen as providing sufficient flexibility to allow for sensible
choice of law, it is unlikely that they will be utilized with great frequency.
The entire purpose of the mass disaster litigation proposal is to simplify
litigation and bring about efficient results. If courts will seek to foster the
interests of states as dictated by modern choice of law analyses they will
have no alternative but to fractionalize the litigation. Whether this is done
by mimicking the choice of law analysis of the transferor state, as is the case
today under Klaxon '0 ' and Van Dusen,1 2 or by a federal court conducting
its own policy-oriented choice of law analysis, the ultimate result in terms
of litigation efficiency is likely to be the same. Different law will apply to
different parties and different issues.
In order to avoid fractionalization, a court will be compelled to opt for
the law of a single jurisdiction. As we have demonstrated, the only law that
will be applicable to all parties will be the lex loci delicti or the lex loci rei
actus. In the case of multiple product liability defendants, lex loci delicti
will most often be the only law that can constitutionally be applied to all
parties. In the case of multiple plaintiffs and a single defendant, either lex
rei actus, or some aspect of corporate domicile, will govern. It is of some
interest that the ABA Mass Tort Report rejected such bright line choice of
law rules. The drafters note:
If the federal standard yielded litmus-like results - for example, the
law of the state of defendant's incorporation or its principal place of
business - ascertaining the governing state law would be easy.
There are, however, obvious drawbacks to such bright-line rules including the real or fanciful fear that defendants engaged in high-risk
activity may gravitate toward states with the most protective tort
rules. 103
Precisely because the drafters did not account for Allstate and Shutts, they
have mandated that federal courts adopt the very choice of law rules that
they find so objectionable. Ultimately, choice of law either reverts back to
the stone age or the goal of efficiency is a mirage.
101. Klaxon v. Stentor Elec. Mfg., 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
102. Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612 (1964).
103. ABA Mass Tort Report, supra note 1, at 31-32.
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The question must be confronted. Do the goals of efficiency and uniformity justify the application of rigid choice of law rules that sacrifice the
interests of states, as well as a majority of the litigants? We believe that the
late Brainard Currie long ago put that argument to rest when he demolished the First Restatement territorially-oriented choice of law rules." °4
The examples provided in the preceding sections vividly demonstrate that
the price to be paid for these goals is unacceptably high. This would be true
even if the problems presently posed by mass disaster litigation were of sufficient merit to warrant a legislative response. It is a fortiori correct if heed
is paid to the views of Paul D. Rheingold, the dissenting member of the
05
Mass Tort Commission.1
Paul Rheingold brought to the commission vast experience in mass tort
litigation, having been deeply involved in such major cases as Dalkon
Shield, asbestos, DES, Mer/29, oral contraceptives, Aralen and swine flu
vaccine. Rheingold argued that only three mass tort cases have presented
serious management problems to the American court system: asbestos,
Agent Orange and Dalkon Shield. In each of these cases, the courts have
been besieged by several hundred thousand potential claimants. For more
routine mass tort cases, Rheingold asserted that the present structure of
multi-district litigation works so well that it is rare for cases to be returned
to the transferor court for actual litigation.
Rheingold argued convincingly that for the smaller mass disaster cases,
changing the present system is not warranted. However, for the true megamass disaster cases, the changes proposed by the ABA do not even begin to
meet the problem. Those cases require more than procedural changes to
manage the litigation. Serious changes in substantive law on such issues as
causation and liability to future claimants, whose causes of action have not
yet matured, must be effected if there is any hope of resolving the megamass disaster cases. In short, Rheingold concluded that the ABA Report
seeks change where none is needed and is far too timid for the truly serious
mass disaster cases.
We have demonstrated that both the ABA proposal and H.R. 3406 will
require courts to deprive plaintiffs and defendants of important rights that
would normally accrue to them under state law. The choice of law imposed
would often be nonsensical. In the vast majority of routine mass disaster
cases, no problem would even remotely warrant such unjust results to individual claimants. As for the true mega-mass disaster cases, though a problem does exist, we remain unconvinced that stripping litigants of their
104. See B. CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICTS
105. See ABA Mass Tort Report, supra note 1, App. E.
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rights based on an irrational choice of law rule is the solution. In those
cases, there is no alternative to directly federalizing the cause of action and
fashioning special rules that will address both the procedural and substantive law problems which are indigenous to them.
CONCLUSION

Starting with laudable motives, the drafters of the ABA Mass Torts
Commission Report"°6 and H.R. 3406107 have proposed a method for dealing with mass tort litigation which seeks to foster more efficient management of this genre of cases. In doing so, they have failed to account for
several major constitutional choice of law cases. They have assumed that
courts have flexibility in choosing law that they simply do not possess under
the dictates of Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague "8 and PhillipsPetroleum v.
Shutts.' 09 As a practical matter, once homage is paid to governing constitutional law principles, courts will be forced to resolve the choice of law issues
by utilizing regressive choice of law rules. Admittedly, the legislation will
help the "trains run on time." However, the courts will soon discover that
most of the passengers will be going in the wrong direction. The ABA
Mass Torts Commission Report and H.R. 3406 deserve outright rejection.
They cannot meet their stated goals without causing more harm than good.

106.
107.
108.
109.

Id. at i.
H.R. 3406, supra note 3.
449 U.S. 302 (1981).
472 U.S. 797 (1985).

